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I. Introduction
The most popular policy tool used in the last decade in developing countries
to increase human capital has been the conditional cash transfer program,
which provides cash payments to households conditional on regular school
attendance and visiting health clinics. Many governments implemented ex-
perimental frameworks to assess the impacts of conditional cash transfers on
employment, schooling, and health among poor eligible households (PRO-
GRESA in Mexico and PRAF in Honduras, among others). Although con-
ditional cash transfers have achieved quantified success in reaching the poor
and bringing about short-term improvements in consumption, education, and
health (Rawlings and Rubio 2003; Gertler 2004; Schultz 2004), most of the
literature has focused on mean impacts. As Heckman, Smith, and Clements
(1997) point out, however, judgments about the “success” of a social program
should depend on more than the average impact. For example, it may be of
interest to investigate whether social programs have differential effects for any
subpopulation defined by covariates, for example, gender effects, or whether
there is heterogeneity in the effect of treatment. Knowledge of whether a
program’s impacts are concentrated among a few individuals is important for
the effectiveness of the program in reaching its target population.
This study contributes to the small but growing literature on the estimation
of heterogeneous effects of conditional cash transfers in developing countries.
This type of program has received a great deal of attention among policy
makers, influencing adoption of new policies in Latin and Central America.
The assessment of heterogeneous impacts is done with a unique data set from
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a social experiment in Nicaragua designed to evaluate a conditional cash
transfer program targeted to poor rural households, the Red de Proteccion
Social (hereafter RPS) or Social Safety Net. The analysis takes advantage of
the random assignment of localities to treatment and control groups so that
program participation is not correlated in expectation with either observed or
unobserved individual characteristics and outcome differences provide an un-
biased estimate of the true mean impact of the program. The purpose of this
study is to investigate the degree of heterogeneity in program impacts of the
RPS program for education, health, and nutrition in Nicaragua. This paper
explores the heterogeneity of impacts as a function of observable characteristics
(age, gender, poverty, and household head characteristics) and the criteria used
by the RPS to select beneficiaries. This study also investigates the overall
heterogeneity of program impacts using quantile treatment effects (QTE),
which allows us to test whether conditional transfers lead to larger or smaller
changes in some parts of the outcome distribution.
This study adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, the existing
literature on conditional cash transfers focuses on mean impacts, in the full
sample and in demographic subgroups. This paper goes beyond mean impacts
and interaction variables and tests whether there are heterogeneous impacts
of conditional cash transfers on the distribution of expenditures. Conditional
cash programs, such as the RPS, have differential effects on household behavior
given that transfers affect regular school attendance and health visits. For
example, the school cash transfer is conditional on regular attendance of chil-
dren ages 7–13 who have not yet completed the fourth grade. For households
with children ages 7–13 years who have not completed fourth grade and are
not attending school, the program has income effects of the cash transfer and
substitution effects of a lower price of schooling driven by the attendance
requirement. Some households may have to bear the cost of children’s forgone
labor earnings due to the implicit reduction in labor time, in which case the
impact on household expenditures may be negative if the RPS transfer does
not make up for losses in income from market work. The monetary transfer
received to buy food (or food cash transfer), however, has a positive effect on
household expenditure. The net effect on expenditures could be positive or
negative. Conditional cash transfers have differential effects based on whether
the household is meeting the requirements prior to the implementation of
the program. Knowing more about this heterogeneity is relevant to antipoverty
policies (Ravallion 2007).
Second, the literature on QTE has been limited mostly to the U.S. context.
Recent papers, such as Heckman et al. (1997), Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens
(2002), Black et al. (2003), and Firpo (2007), have used QTE to assess the
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impacts of training programs on labor outcomes. Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes
(2005, 2006) examine the impact of welfare reform experiments on earnings
and total income. Overall, the main finding is that variation in the impact
of treatment across persons is an important aspect of the evaluation problem.
To the best of my knowledge, Djebbari and Smith’s (2005) study represents
the first to analyze heterogeneous impacts of social programs in a developing
country using QTE.
Third, QTE corresponds, for any fixed percentile, to the horizontal distance
between two cumulative distribution functions. Under the rank preservation
assumption, QTE can be interpreted as the treatment effect for individuals at
particular quantiles of the control group outcome distribution or the treatment
effect for each quantile in the distribution (Bitler et al. 2005). Without the
rank preservation assumption, QTE represents how various quantiles of the
outcome distribution change in the treatment and control groups, but we
cannot make an inference of the impact on any particular person. This paper
presents evidence of rank invariance in the RPS context to help clarify the
interpretation of the QTE impacts for the development literature.
The main results show that impact estimates vary among the eligible pop-
ulation. From the analysis on subgroups, the estimates show that boys ex-
perienced a larger positive impact of the program on schooling and a negative
impact on the probability of engaging in labor activities and hours worked.
The estimates also show that older children experienced a smaller impact of
the program on schooling and participation in labor activities. There are also
differential impacts by whether the child is living with a male head of house-
hold and with education of the head of household. To assess the effectiveness
of the targeting criteria, the analysis considers the interaction between the
treatment indicator and marginality index and household per capita expen-
ditures, separately. The main results show that children located in more im-
poverished areas experienced a larger impact on schooling and a smaller impact
on working hours.
From the QTE analysis, the estimates suggest that the positive program
impact in per capita food expenditures and total per capita expenditures is
smaller for households who are in the lower tail of the expenditure distribution.
The estimates show that program impacts are larger for households who had
lower levels of food shares prior to the program. These findings are consistent
with the theoretical prediction that treatment effects on expenditures are lower
for households whose costs of complying with the program requirements are
highest. Tests of the null hypothesis of constant treatment effects reveal that
these findings could not have been revealed using mean impact analysis. Finally,
joint tests of rank preservation show that the distributions of observable char-
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acteristics in all ranges of the expenditures distribution do not vary significantly
between the treatment and control groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the RPS
program and data, and Section III outlines the theoretical framework. Section
IV outlines the empirical strategy, and this is followed by a discussion of the
empirical results in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II. The RPS Program
A. Program Structure and Beneﬁts
Nicaragua is a lower-middle-income country. With an estimated per capita
GDP of US$817 in 2004, Nicaragua remains the second poorest country in
the Latin America and Caribbean region after Haiti. In 2000, the Nicaraguan
government implemented the Red de Proteccion Social, or Social Safety Net,
to encourage educational attainment and help impoverished households in
rural areas. Phase I of the program started with a budget of US$11 million,
representing approximately 0.2% of Nicaragua’s GDP (Maluccio and Flores
2005). With financial assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank
and the government of Nicaragua, the RPS program was expanded in 2002
with a US$20 million budget for coverage for an additional 3 years. The RPS
program provided benefits conditional on school attendance and health check-
ups, where participants were identified using a detailed targeting process aimed
at reaching poor people in rural areas.
For Phase I of the RPS, the government of Nicaragua selected the depart-
ments of Madriz and Matagalpa from the northern part of the Central Region.
This selection was based on the departments’ ability to implement the program
in terms of institutional and local government capacity, high poverty levels
within the communities, and proximity to the capital of Nicaragua. In 1998,
approximately 80% of the rural population in Madriz and Matagalpa was poor
and half was extremely poor.
Targeting of poor households was implemented at the RPS headquarters in
two stages: (1) officials selected six municipalities within these two departments
based on criteria similar to those used at the department level, and (2) officials
selected eligible comarcas within the selected municipalities based on the
marginality index constructed from the 1995 National Population and Hous-
ing Census. Comarcas (hereafter called localities) are administrative areas within
municipalities including between one and five small communities averaging
100 households each. This marginality index used locality-level information
on the illiteracy rate of persons over age 5, access to basic infrastructure
(running water and sewage), and average family size. The higher the value of
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TABLE 1
NICARAGUAN RPS BENEFICIARY REQUIREMENTS
Household Type
With No Tar-
geted
Children
(A)
With Children
Ages 0–5
(B)
With Children
Ages 7–13
Who Have Not
Completed
Fourth Grade
(C)
Attend bimonthly health education workshops   
Bring children to prescheduled health care
appointments 
Monthly ( 0–2 years)
Bimonthly (2–5 years)
Adequate weight gain for children under 5a 
Enrollment in grades 1–4 of all targeted children in
the household 
Regular attendance (85%) of all targeted children in
the household 
Promotion at end of school yearb 
Bono a la Oferta or teacher transfer 
Up-to-date vaccination for all children under 5 years 
Source. Maluccio and Flores (2005).
a This requirement was discontinued in Phase II in 2003.
b This condition was not enforced.
the marginality index, the more impoverished the area. Out of 59 localities,
42 eligible rural localities were identified as having a high or very high
marginality index and thus preselected for the program.1
Program benefits are conditional income transfers composed of (table 1):
1. Each eligible household received money to buy food (called the
food cash transfer) every other month. In order to receive this transfer, a
household member (typically the mother) is required to attend educational
workshops and bring their children under the age of 5 for preventive health
care appointments (including vaccinations and growth monitoring). Chil-
dren younger than age 2 were seen monthly and those between ages 2 and
5, every other month. In September 2000, the food transfer was US$224
a year, representing 13% of total annual household expenditures in bene-
ficiary households before the program.
2. Contingent on enrollment and regular attendance, each household
with children ages 7–13 who had not completed the fourth grade of primary
1 The RPS program did not identify poor households within targeted localities, as in PROGRESA.
See Maluccio and Flores (2005) for an assessment of the targeting procedure.
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school received a fixed cash transfer every other month.2 In addition, for
each eligible child in the household enrolled in school, the household re-
ceived an annual lump sum transfer for school supplies and uniforms (called
the school supplies transfer).3 In September 2000, the school attendance
transfer and the school supplies transfer were US$112 and US$21, respec-
tively.
To enforce compliance with program requirements, beneficiaries did not
receive the transfer if they failed to carry out the conditions previously de-
scribed. Less than 1% of households were expelled during the first two years
of delivering transfers, though 5% voluntarily left the program, for example,
by dropping out or migrating out of the program area (Maluccio and Flores
2005).
B. The Experimental Design and Data
The evaluation design is based on an experiment with randomization of lo-
calities into treatment and control groups. One-half of the 42 localities were
randomly selected into the program. The selection was done at a public event
in which the localities were ordered by their marginality index scores and
stratified into seven groups of six localities each. Within each group, random-
ization was achieved by blindly drawing one of six colored balls without
replacement; the first three were selected in the program and the other three
in the control group.4
All households in selected localities are interviewed before and after the
random assignment. The evaluation data set consists of panel data observations
for 1,359 households over three rounds of survey (baseline: September 2000;
follow-ups: October 2001 and October 2002). Surveys at the individual and
household level collected information on socioeconomic and demographic char-
acteristics such as parental schooling, labor market outcomes, health, nutrition,
2 Children are required to enroll and attend classes at least 85% of the time, i.e., no more than
five absences every 2 months without valid excuse.
This design seems to embody a perverse incentive for students to keep repeating the fourth
grade so that families can continue to receive the subsidy. In order to eliminate this problem, the
program design included a number of causes for which the household may be expelled from the
program, among them, if the beneficiary child failed to be promoted to the next grade. This
condition, however, was deemed unfair and never enforced. Thanks to the referee for pointing this
out.
3 The lump sum transfer for school supplies and uniforms varies with the number of eligible
children, while the school attendance transfer is a lump sum per household, regardless of the
number of children.
4 The evaluation was designed to last for 1 year, but because of delays in funding the implementation
of the program was postponed in control localities until 2003.
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS
2000 2001 2002
Household level:
Per capita total consumption 3,885.08 3,852.74 3,880.91
Per capita food consumption 2,672.33 2,669.20 2,634.18
Food share .704 .688 .683
Head of household:
Age 44.27 46.05 47.01
Male .858 .858 .858
Years of educationa 1.652 … …
Children 7–13 years at baseline:
Gender .521 .521 .521
Age 9.847 10.938 11.969
School attendance .766 .885 .855
Participation in labor activities .150 .109 .177
Weekly working hours 3.51 2.90 5.31
Weekly working hours conditional on
employment 23.47 26.49 30.07
Note. Expenditures levels are in Nicaraguan Cordobas; the equivalent exchange rate is US$1p C$13.
Sample includes 1,359 households with observations in the panel 2000/2001/2002.
a Data available only for 2000.
and attributes of the physical infrastructure of the household, among others.5
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each year. Prior to the program, the
mean per capita consumption was 3,885 Nicaraguan Cordobas (hereafter C$)
or about US$298.9 a year, with 70% allocated to food consumption. Table 2
also shows that 77% of children ages 7–13 years attend school, and 15%
participate in labor activities for an average of 23.5 hours per week.
The randomization is at the locality level rather than at the household or
individual level. One reason for doing the random assignment at the locality
level was to avoid spillover effects between treated and untreated individuals
in the same locality. This was part of the motivation for doing the random
assignment at the village level in the PROGRESA evaluation as well.6 As-
signment by randomization at the locality level ensures that the treatment
and control groups are similar on average in terms of observable and unob-
5 In panel data, both nonresponse and attrition are potential concerns for the empirical analysis.
In 2001 and 2002, about 92% and 88% of the targeted households were reinterviewed, respectively.
The principal reasons for failure to interview targeted sample households were that household
members were temporarily absent or that the dwelling appeared to be uninhabited. Maluccio and
Flores (2005) examine the correlates of the observed attrition and conclude that attrition is not a
major concern for estimating program effects and emphasize that using only the balanced panel
is likely to slightly underestimate the effects.
6 For PROGRESA, Behrman and Todd (1999) found that treatment and control groups had similar
mean outcomes at the locality level before the program; however, they find small differences at
the household and individual level. Thanks to the referee for pointing this out.
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TABLE 3
RPS SUMMARY STATISTICS: 2000 BASELINE (STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)
Treatment Control Difference
Household level:
Per capita total consumption 4,020.90 3,738.24 282.66
(203.22) (212.23) (290.34)
Per capita food consumption 2,759.87 2,577.68 182.193
(129.02) (128.33) (179.81)
Food share .70 .71 .01
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Household head:
Age 44.64 43.86 .77
(.85) (.73) (1.11)
Male .87 .85 .02
(.01) (.01) (.02)
Years of education 1.70 1.60 .10
(.14) (.09) (.16)
N 706 653 1,359
Children 7–13 years old:
Gender .53 .51 .02
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Age 9.82 9.87 .05
(.07) (.07) (.10)
School attendance .77 .77 .00
(.01) (.01) (.02)
Participation in labor activities .14 .16 .02
(.01) (.01) (.02)
Working hours 3.26 3.78 .52
(.33) (.37) (.49)
N 916 829 1,745
Note. Expenditure levels are in Nicaraguan Cordobas; the equivalent exchange rate is US$1p C$13.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the locality level. Sample includes 1,359 households with obser-
vations in the panel 2000/2001/2002.
servable characteristics. There is a chance, however, of observing some non-
randomness in terms of differences between localities selected for the control
and treatment groups at the household level prior to the program, since
estimates of average quantities are more reliable with large sample sizes and
the sample subject to randomization is small, 42 localities (Behrman and Todd
1999). Table 3 shows t-tests of the equality of means at the household and
individual level. Main results show that the majority of variables measured
prior to the random assignment do not differ between the treatment and
control groups, which suggests that the sample is well balanced across these
groups.7
7 Maluccio and Flores (2005) analyze 15 indicators and find small differences only in household
size and number of children younger than 5 years old.
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III. Theoretical Framework
This section outlines a model of household decision making in the presence
of conditional cash transfers in order to get a better understanding of potential
heterogeneous impacts of the RPS program. The model is based on Skoufias
and Parker (2001) and Djebbari and Smith (2005). The analysis begins first
by considering household time allocation in the absence of the conditional
cash transfer. Neoclassical models of household decision making are commonly
employed in this analysis. In this framework, parents make decisions about
the allocation of a child’s schooling time, the time of other household members,
and the purchase of goods and services. Parents will invest in each child’s
schooling up to the point where the marginal costs of a child’s time in school
equal the marginal benefits considering the opportunity cost of schooling,
which is the forgone earning from work.
The opportunity cost of children’s time is likely to vary with observed
characteristics. For example, it is expected to see gender and age differences
in child labor if boys and girls have different returns to education or older
children have a comparative advantage in the labor market. It is important
to note that the RPS does not provide higher payments for female enrollment
in school as in PROGRESA where the main idea was to equalize the incentive
for girls in the face of higher wages, on average, for boys in the labor market.
Girls in secondary school received slightly higher subsidies (by about $2 per
month) than boys in Mexico.
The existing literature on heterogeneity of treatment effects predominantly
looks at the impact of the program as if it varies with observed characteristics
or subgroups of the population. In the case of conditional cash transfers,
other papers have found evidence of differential impacts on schooling and
child labor for girls versus boys, and primary-school-age children versus
secondary-school–age children, and by socioeconomic status (e.g., Maluccio
and Flores [2005] for RPS; Skoufias [2005] for PROGRESA; Schady and
Araujo [2006] in Ecuador; Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd [2005] for PRO-
GRESA; Filmer and Schady [2008] for Cambodia; Djebbari and Smith
[2005] for PROGRESA).
The conditionality of the transfer has important effects on household be-
havior as well. The monetary school and food cash transfers are linked to the
school attendance of children ages 7–13, participation in health clinics, and
other criteria. If they were not conditioned, transfers would act as a pure
income effect. Conditionality of the transfers results in changes in the marginal
cost of investment in schooling. If children participate in the program with
full compliance of the requirements, time devoted to schooling changes: chil-
dren now receive transfers for attendance and school supplies but lose wages
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for the extra time the child devotes to schooling. What matters is the ratio
of the child’s wage and the marginal increase in income due to the transfer.
Participation and compliance with the RPS program might affect household
behavior as follows:8
Households with no children in the targeted age ranges or with children
under age 5 (but without children ages 7–13 who have not completed
the fourth grade) receive the food cash transfer. These transfers will
have a pure income effect, and it is expected that these households
will have higher expenditures after the program.
Households with children ages 7–13 years old who have completed fourth
grade at primary school and are attending school without the program
will be eligible to receive food transfers but not school transfers. Food
cash transfers will have a pure income effect, and it is expected that
these households will have higher expenditures after the program.
Households with children ages 7–13 years who have not completed fourth
grade but are attending school even without the program are eligible
for both the food and school cash transfers. These transfers will have
a pure income effect, and it is expected that these households will
have higher expenditures after the program.
For households with children ages 7–13 years who have not completed
fourth grade and are not attending school without the program, the
RPS program combines the income effect of the school transfer with
the substitution effect of a lower price of schooling driven by the
attendance requirement. Some households may have to bear the cost
of children’s forgone labor earnings due to the implicit reduction in
labor time, in which case the impact on household expenditures may
be negative if the RPS transfer does not make up for losses in income
from market work. Thus the program impact on household expen-
ditures may be negative. At the same time, the food cash transfer will
have an income effect. The net effect of the school and food transfer
on expenditures could be positive or negative for these households.
In sum, the predicted effect on expenditures is heterogeneous. At the top
of the expenditures distribution, or the richest households among the eligible
ones, households are meeting or almost meeting program requirements prior
to the program and, thus, the impacts will be larger. For some part of the
8 In the RPS data, approximately 20% of the beneficiary households had no targeted children,
25% only children under age 5, 20% only children ages 7–13, and the remaining 35% both
children under 5 and 7–13-year-olds.
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bottom of the expenditures distribution there are households who are not
meeting the requirements (e.g., children are not going to school the minimum
required time) and for which the cost of participation is the highest (children’s
contribution is significant); for them the program impacts could be positive
or negative. These households are likely to be the ones who rely greatly on
child labor. As Basu and Van’s (1998) seminal model shows, a household will
send children to work if adult income or family income from nonchild labor
sources becomes very low. In between these extremes, the effect of the program
depends on whether the child is attending school the minimum required time
or not. The extent to which the program has a significant impact on different
parts of the expenditure distribution can only be determined through empirical
analysis.
IV. Empirical Strategy
Let denote the potential outcomes of interest in the presence of treatment,Y1
, and without treatment, . Each individual experiences onlyT p 1 Y T p 0i 0 i
one of these treatment and untreated outcomes; thus, the critical objective is
to establish a credible comparison group or a group of individuals who in the
absence of the program would have had outcomes similar to those who were
exposed to the program. In this study, the treatment and control group are
randomly selected, so that program participation is not correlated in expec-
tation with either observed or unobserved individual characteristics, and out-
come differences provide an unbiased estimate of the true mean impact of the
program.9
What we are interested is in estimating the expected average effect that
the RPS program has on different outcomes, or the average treatment effect
(ATE), . The literature also focuses on the mean impact ofD p E(Y Y )ATE 1 0
treatment on the treated (ATET), given by . UnderD p E(Y YFTp 1)ATET 1 0
the assumptions of no equilibrium effects and no randomization bias, the
randomized experiment identifies the ATET (Djebbari and Smith 2008).
A. Impacts at the Subgroup Level
The first method generates impact estimates that vary among the eligible
population by considering variation in impacts as a function of observable
characteristics through the interaction of the treatment indicator in equation
9 See Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer (2007) for a methodological discussion of randomization of
experiments in developing countries.
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(1) with a variety of individual and locality characteristics as follows:
y p b  b # C  b T  b T # C X a q , (1)i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i i i i
where is some outcome measure, is the characteristic of interest, is ay C Ti i i
dummy variable representing whether the locality was randomly assigned to
the treatment or control group, and represent the interactions betweenT # Ci i
the characteristics and the treatment indicator.
The interpretation of the coefficients is as follows: for example, in the
specification that tests for heterogeneous impacts by gender, is a dummyCi
variable equal to one if the child is male, the coefficient is an estimate ofb1
the difference in the outcome between boys and girls, the RPS effect for girls
is given by , the corresponding effect for boys is given by the sum of theb2
coefficients . If is statistically significantly different from zero, thereb  b b2 3 3
is evidence of heterogeneity of treatment effects by gender.
The vector of covariates also includes characteristics of the head of house-Ci
hold and locality. I also use a criterion used by PRS to select beneficiaries, the
locality marginality index. Program officials using data from the 1995 Ni-
caraguan Household Survey, collected prior to the program, constructed this
index. Following the analysis in Djebbari and Smith (2005) for Mexico, the
impact of conditional cash transfers is expected to be largest for households
living in more impoverished localities as defined by the marginality index. If
the targeting mechanism is efficient, then households in the most marginal
localities get a greater program impact than less marginal places. Equation
(1) also controls for other baseline household and individual characteristics
( ) to take into account any differences that were present despite randomi-Xi
zation and to increase the precision of the coefficient estimates. The standard
errors are clustered at the locality level.
B. Quantile Treatment Effects
The method described in the previous section emphasized differences in means.
While the mean is important, comparisons of means only account for shifts
in the central tendency of a distribution. For many questions, knowledge of
distributional parameters is required; for example, the proportion that benefit
from treatment, the proportion that gain at least a fixed amount, or the
quantiles of treatment effect (Heckman et al. 1997). One particular feature of
interest in the RPS context is the behavior at the left tail of the consumption
distribution, as this measures consumption of those households that most likely
are not meeting the requirements (children are not going to school the min-
imum required time) and for which the cost of participation is the highest
(children’s contribution is significant). In order to capture responses across the
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entire distribution of consumption, the second econometric method uses the
QTE approach.
Most of the existing literature on QTE is based on social experiments in
employment, training, and welfare programs in the United States. Heckman
et al. (1997) find strong evidence that heterogeneity is an important feature
of impact distributions using experimental data from the National Job Training
Partnership Act Study. Black et al. (2003), using experimental data from the
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services program, find that the estimated
impact of treatment varies widely across quantiles of the outcome distributions.
The pattern of impacts suggests that the treatment has its largest effect on
persons whose probability of unemployment insurance benefit exhaustion with-
out treatment would be of moderate duration. In evaluating the economic
effects of welfare reform, Bitler et al. (2005, 2006) find strong evidence against
the common effect assumption using experimental data from the Connecticut’s
Job First Waiver program and the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project. Their
estimates suggest substantial heterogeneity in the impact of welfare reform
on earnings and total income, which is consistent with the predictions from
the static labor supply model.
Let and denote the outcome of interest in the treated and controlY Y1 0
states with corresponding cumulative distribution functions F(y)p Pr [Y ≤1 1
and . Let denote the quantile of each distributiony] F (y)p Pr [Y ≤ y] v0 0
y (T)p inf {y : F (y) ≥ v}, Tp 0, 1, (2)v T
where “inf” is the smallest attainable value of y that satisfies the condition
stated in the braces. The quantile treatment effect at quantile is defined asv
. For example, suppose that y represents familyQTED p y (Tp 1) y (Tp 0)v v v
income in a given year, is that level of income for households in they0.25
treatment (control) group such that 25% of treatment (control) households
have income below it. The expression is given by the difference betweenQTED0.25
the income of households in the 25th percentile of the treated distribution
and the 25th percentile of the control distribution.
The impact estimate for a given quantile is the coefficient on the treatment
indicator from the corresponding quantile regression as follows:
Q (yFT)p a(v) b(v)T , v (0, 1), (3)v i i
where denotes the quantile of expenditures conditional onQ (yFT) vv i
treatment.10
As presented above in table 2, the RPS sample is well balanced, and there
10 See Koenker and Basset (1978).
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are few statistical differences in the observable characteristics in the two groups.
To correct for any differences not accounted for by the randomization of lo-
calities into treatment and control groups and to obtain more precise estimates,
I have included covariates as in Djebbari and Smith (2005).11 The vector of
control variables includes characteristics of the head of household (age, edu-
cation, gender, employment) and household demographic composition.12 The
advantage of the QTE approach relative to the common effect model is that
the impact of the program on different quantiles of the outcome distribution
does not have to be constant.
Note that although average differences equal differences in averages, the
treatment effect at quantile is not the quantile of the difference ( ). TheY Y1 0
QTE corresponds, for any fixed percentile, to the horizontal distance between
two cumulative distribution functions. Under the rank preservation assump-
tion, QTE can be interpreted as the treatment effect for individuals at particular
quantiles of the control group outcome distribution or the treatment effect
for the person located at quantile in the distribution (Heckman et al. 1997;
Bitler et al. 2005). Without the rank preservation assumption, QTE represents
how various quantiles of the outcome distribution change in the treatment
and control groups, but we cannot make an inference about the impact on
any particular person.
Rank preservation across treatment status is a strong assumption, as it
requires that the rank of the potential outcome for a given individual would
be the same under treatment as under nontreatment. There are two ways to
deal with cases where the rank invariance assumption is not valid. Heckman
et al. (1997) suggest computing bounds for the QTE, allowing for several
possibilities of reordering of the ranks. The second approach argues that even
without this assumption, QTE estimates are informative about the overall
impacts of the program and, therefore, still meaningful parameters for policy
purposes. In the absence of rank invariance, the interpretation of QTE is the
difference in the treated and control distributions, not the treatment effects
for identifiable people in either distribution (Bitler et al. 2005, 2006). The
last section of the paper analyzes whether the rank invariance assumption is
valid in the RPS context.
11 Including covariates in the estimation of quantile treatment effects changes somewhat the nature
of the treatment effect being estimated and the assumption that underlies it (see Djebbari and
Smith 2008). Thanks to the referee for pointing this out.
12 Unreported regressions show that the QTE estimates, without controlling for covariates, are in
the 95% range of the QTE estimates controlling for covariates. With nonexperimental data, the
estimation can adjust for differences in baseline observable characteristics by using propensity score
weighting as in Bitler et al. (2006) and Firpo (2007).
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C. Outcomes of Interest
The outcomes of interest in the empirical section include household and in-
dividual level variables. The RPS program aims at improving the educational
and health outcomes of children. I focus on children ages 7–13 years old at
the baseline because they are most likely to be affected by the conditionality
of the cash transfers. Outcomes of interest include child labor (participation
and working hours) and school attendance. Child labor refers to children who
are engaged in market work, which includes wage employment, self-employ-
ment, agriculture, unpaid work in a family business, and helping on the family
farm.13
Impacts for schooling and child labor outcomes are estimated using OLS.
One important feature of the data is the presence of a substantial number of
children reporting zero hours of work; thus I also include the estimates from
the Tobit regression.
To analyze the QTE on household welfare the empirical literature uses
household consumption rather than income because data on expenditures are
likely to be more accurate and consumption expenditures have a stronger link
with current levels of welfare (Deaton 1997). At the household level, this
study analyzes three outcomes of interest: per capita total expenditure, per
capita food expenditure, and food share of total expenditures. The analysis of
food expenditures is important because one of the keys of the program is
supplementing income to increase expenditures on food so as to improve
household nutrition. The expenditure variables include food, nonfood items,
and the value of food produced and consumed at home.14
V. Results
A. Impacts along Observable Characteristics
Table 4 reports estimated coefficients of the treatment indicator interacted
with covariates of interest. The main results show that the program has different
impacts on children with different observable characteristics. For example,
boys ages 7–13 years experienced a statistically significant larger impact on
school attendance than girls. Estimates suggest that the RPS program increased
school attendance by 12 percentage points for girls and by 18 percentage
points for boys in 2001. In addition, the reduction in the probability of
13 Labor laws in Nicaragua establish age 14 as the basic minimum age for work. Children between
the ages of 14 and 17 can work a maximum of 6 hours per day but not at night. The employment
of youth is prohibited in places that endanger their health and safety, such as mines, garbage
dumps, and night entertainment venues (i.e., nightclubs, bars, etc.). Government enforcement,
however, is far from strict.
14 See Maluccio and Flores (2005) for more detailed information on the constructed variables.
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engaging in market activities is larger for boys. Estimates show that boys
experienced a greater impact of the program on reducing the probability of
engaging in market work and hours worked. The results show that the RPS
program decreased participation in labor activities for boys by 11 percentage
points in 2001 and 14 percentage points in 2002, while the negative effect
of the RPS program on labor participation for girls is small, just one percentage
point in both years. These findings are important given that the program did
not provide differential transfers to boys and girls. For instance, PROGRESA
provided slightly more money to girls enrolled in secondary school, and the
results show that the program had a greater impact on secondary age girls
(Skoufias and Parker 2001). In addition, it is important to note that this
definition of work does not include other activities usually not remunerated
and performed in the same household, such as taking care of younger siblings,
cleaning, and cooking, among other household chores. A broader definition
including detailed household chores may decrease this gender difference in
participation rates.
The coefficient on the interaction term between treatment and age shows
that older children experienced a smaller impact of the program on schooling
as well as on the probability of engaging in market work and hours worked.
This is related to previous findings that with higher age potential earnings
increase; thus, transfers might not be high enough to compensate for forgone
earnings. The interaction with household head education shows that children
with more educated head of households experienced a smaller impact of the
program on schooling. The empirical literature has shown that more educated
parents use the information provided in health clinics about nutrition more
efficiently and value schooling more and child labor less (Strauss and Thomas
1998). Thus, school attendance among children living in more educated house-
holds would be higher and the margins for improvement lower than among
children in households with lower parental education. In addition, children
living with a male head of household experienced a smaller impact of the
program on school attendance, participation in labor activities, and hours
worked. Similarly, children living in larger households experienced a smaller
impact of the program on school attendance, labor force participation, and
hours worked.
The last rows show the effect of the treatment interacted with the margin-
ality index and household per capita expenditures, separately, to analyze the
targeting mechanism of the program. Based on the marginality index, I group
households into quintiles and interact the treatment indicator with the index
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categories.15 If the actual targeting of the program is efficient, then the impact
in schooling should decrease from the poorest index (expenditures) quantiles
to the richest index (expenditures) quantiles. As the estimates from table 4
show, children living in more impoverished areas experienced larger impacts
of the program on school attendance in 2001. Similar results are obtained
with the interaction of the treatment indicator and quintiles of household per
capita expenditures. In 2002, however, children living in more impoverished
areas experienced a smaller impact of the program on schooling. For example,
children in the first quintile of the marginality index (poorest) experienced an
increased in school attendance of 8 percentage points, whereas children in the
highest quintile experienced an increase in schooling of 19 percentage points.
The estimates also show that children in the poorest households experienced
smaller impacts of the program on the probability of engaging in labor ac-
tivities. Most of the interactions between the treatment indicator and the
quintiles of the marginality index (expenditures), however, are not statistically
significant. Finally, the last row in table 4 rejects the null hypothesis that all
of the coefficients on the interaction terms equal zero.
B. Quantile Treatment Effect Regression
The quantile treatment effects provide information on how the impact at the
household level varies at different points of the expenditure distribution. Fig-
ures 1–6 plot the quantiles using posttreatment data. The solid line represents
the estimate of the RPS treatment in a given quantile. The associated 95%
confidence intervals are obtained from the bootstrap with 1,000 replications
clustered at the locality level. These bootstrap confidence intervals are plotted
on the graph with dashed lines. For comparison purposes, the mean treatment
effect is plotted as a small dashed line.16
Overall, RPS treatment group expenditures are greater than control group
expenditures, yielding positive impacts at each quantile of the distribution.
For per capita total expenditures and per capita food expenditures, the difference
increases from the lowest percentile to the highest percentile of the distribution.
These findings suggest that households with lower expenditures tend to receive
15 Quintiles of the marginality index are defined so that the lowest quintile includes people with
the highest marginality index (poorest), whereas the highest quintile includes those with the lowest
marginality index (richest).
16 The bootstrap samples are drawn in a manner that mimics the stratified cluster sample design
of the RPS survey by first drawing localities for each bootstrap sample and then sampling within
the selected localities for each bootstrap sample. QTEs are calculated for each bootstrap sample,
and the process is repeated 1,000 times. The standard deviation of a QTE over the bootstrap
replications is an estimator of the standard error.
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Figure 1. Quantile treatment effect on the distribution of annual per capita total expenditures in 2001.
(i) Solid line is the treatment quantile effect. (ii) Dashed lines provide confidence interval from the bootstrap
with 1,000 replications clustered at the locality level. (iii) Small dashed line is the mean impact. (iv) Sample
includes 1,359 households with observations in the panel 2000/2001/2002. (v) In Nicaraguan Cordobas,
the equivalent exchange rate is US$1 p C$13. (vi) QTE is computed for the 91st to 99th quantiles, but
they are not included in the figures because their variances are large enough to distort the scale of the
figures. (vii) The estimation controls for household head characteristics and demographic composition of
the household.
lower positive impacts from the program. As the theoretical framework sug-
gests, the impacts are greater for households with higher expenditures, who
are more likely meeting or almost meeting program requirements prior to the
program. For households with lower expenditures, who are more likely not
meeting the requirements and for whom the cost of participation is therefore
the highest, program impacts are still positive but smaller than for households
at the upper end of the distribution. These results are similar to Djebbari and
Smith’s (2005) QTE findings for the Mexican’s PROGRESA. They find that
program impacts on wealth and nutrition are greater for households who were
at higher levels of wealth and nutrition prior to the program. Similarly, for
the share of food expenditure, the difference decreased from the lowest per-
centile to the highest percentile, suggesting that the program impacts are
higher for households who had lower levels of food shares prior to the
program.17
Figure 1 shows that in 2001 the program impact on per capita total ex-
penditures varies from about C$707 (US$54) to C$3,087 (US$237). In 2002,
the program impact on per capita total expenditures varies from about C$264
17 Figures A1 and A2 show the QTE estimates for the year before random assignment. The structure
of the figures is identical to that of figures 1–6 before; they show the mean effect, the QTEs, and
the bootstrap 95% confidence interval of the QTEs. The effects are statistically not significantly
different from zero for all quantiles.
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Figure 2. Quantile treatment effect on the distribution of annual per capita total expenditures in 2002.
(i) Solid line is the treatment quantile effect. (ii) Dashed lines provide confidence interval from the bootstrap
with 1,000 replications clustered at the locality level. (iii) Small dashed line is the mean impact. (iv) Sample
includes 1,359 households with observations in the panel 2000/2001/2002. (v) In Nicaraguan Cordobas,
the equivalent exchange rate is US$1 p C$13. (vi) QTE is computed for the 91st to 99th quantiles, but
they are not included in the figures because their variances are large enough to distort the scale of the
figures. (vii) The estimation controls for household head characteristics and demographic composition of
the household.
(US$20) to C$1,293 (US$99) for the highest percentile (fig. 2). Many of the
impacts are quite large compared to the mean impacts of C$1,184 and C$820
in 2001 and 2002, respectively. These results suggest that households at the
top of the outcome distribution receive more than five times the impact that
households with lower expenditures do.
I test whether a constant treatment effect could lead to a range as large as
that observed for the QTE point estimate as in Bitler et al. (2006). The test
is as follows: first, keep only observations in the control group and assign a
uniformly distributed random number to the ith household in the bth bootstrap
sample.18 Second, sort the sample of households using this random number
and assign to households with a random number higher than 0.5 andtp 1
in the bth sample and to the remaining households in this bootstraptp 0
sample. Third, add the estimated mean treatment effect to households with
to create a synthetic null treatment group distribution. Finally, use thetp 1
synthetic null treatment group and the remaining control group to construct
the QTE under the null hypothesis. From the resulting individual distribu-
tions, we can generate a confidence interval for testing the maximum minus
minimum range, which compares the distribution for the range under the
null with the real-data QTE range. This confidence interval is estimated with
18 Note that each bootstrap sample has the same size as the control group and sampling is made
with replacement from the observations from the control group only.
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Figure 3. Quantile treatment effect on the distribution of annual per capita food expenditures in 2001.
(i) Solid line is the treatment quantile effect. (ii) Dashed lines provide confidence interval from the bootstrap
with 1,000 replications clustered at the locality level. (iii) Small dashed line is the mean impact. (iv) Sample
includes 1,359 households with observations in the panel 2000/2001/2002. (v) In Nicaraguan Cordobas,
the equivalent exchange rate is US$1 p C$13. (vi) QTE is computed for the 91st to 99th quantiles, but
they are not included in the figures because their variances are large enough to distort the scale of the
figures. (vii) The estimation controls for household head characteristics and demographic composition of
the household.
1,000 bootstrap replications. The test of constant treatment effects suggests
that the null constant treatment range is [3,187.1, 3,384.1] and [2,987.9,
3,198.2] at a confidence level above 95% for 2001 and 2002, respectively.
The QTE range estimated using the data is 2,380.3 and 1,029.8 for 2001
and 2002. These results show that the mean treatment effect is not sufficient
to characterize RPS’s effects on total per capita expenditures.19
Consistent with the RPS program’s goal, additional expenditures as a result
of the transfers were spent predominantly on food. Results for food expenditures
suggest a large degree of treatment impact heterogeneity. In 2001, the program
impact on per capita food expenditures varies from about C$367 (US$28) to
C$3,780 (US$290) for the highest percentile of the distribution (fig. 3). In
2002, the program impact on per capita food expenditures varies from about
C$174 (US$13) to C$1,846 (US$142) for the highest percentile of the dis-
tribution (fig. 4). The mean impacts are C$1,004 and C$733 for 2002 and
2001, which are far below the impacts at the top of the distribution. The
confidence interval for a null of constant treatment effects is [1,963.6, 2,104.9]
and [1,993.8, 2,186.4] at a confidence level of above 95%, while the estimated
19 Using the bootstrap, we can compare the mean range from the null of constant treatment effect
with the mean range from the real data. One-sided tests show that we can reject the null of equality
at the 5% level for all variables and years, separately.
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Figure 4. Quantile treatment effect on the distribution of annual per capita food expenditures in 2002.
(i) Solid line is the treatment quantile effect. (ii) Dashed lines provide confidence interval from the bootstrap
with 1,000 replications clustered at the locality level. (iii) Small dashed line is the mean impact. (iv) Sample
includes 1,359 households with observations in the panel 2000/2001/2002. (v) In Nicaraguan Cordobas,
the equivalent exchange rate is US$1 p C$13. (vi) QTE is computed for the 91st to 99th quantiles, but
they are not included in the figures because their variances are large enough to distort the scale of the
figures. (vii) The estimation controls for household head characteristics and demographic composition of
the household.
range over all quantiles in the real data is 3,412.2 and 1,671.7 for 2001 and
2002, respectively. The positive impact of the program for households with
the highest per capita food expenditures prior to the program is almost seven
times the impact for households with lower food expenditures, which is not
captured by the mean treatment effect estimate.
To further explore the impacts of RPS on the distribution of expenditures,
figures 5 and 6 show QTEs for the share of food expenditures in the household
budget. In 2001, the program impact on food share ranges from about 7.79
percentage points to 0.18 percentage points for the highest percentile. In
2002, the program impact on food share varies from about 8.65 percentage
points to1.42 percentage points for the highest percentile. The mean impacts
are about 4.0 and 3.8 percentage points in 2001 and 2002. The impact is
higher for households who have a lower share of food expenditures prior to
the program. Maluccio and Flores (2005) have shown that not only the number
of food items purchased increased but also their nutritional value.
C. Rank Preservation and Rank Reversal
The main QTE findings show that the impact of the RPS program varied
across the distribution of total and food expenditures. As previously discussed,
the impact of the treatment on the distribution is not the distribution of
treatment effects. This interpretation is valid only under the rank preservation
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Figure 5. Quantile treatment effect on the distribution of food share in 2001. (i) Solid line is the treatment
quantile effect. (ii) Dashed lines provide confidence interval from the bootstrap with 1,000 replications
clustered at the locality level. (iii) Small dashed line is the mean impact. (iv) Sample includes 1,359
households with observations in the panel 2000/2001/2002. (v) QTE is computed for the 1st to 3rd quantiles,
but they are not included in the figures because their variances are large enough to distort the scale of
the figures. (vi) The estimation controls for household head characteristics and demographic composition
of the household.
Figure 6. Quantile treatment effect on the distribution of food share in 2002. (i) Solid line is the treatment
quantile effect. (ii) Dashed lines provide confidence interval from the bootstrap with 1,000 replications
clustered at the locality level. (iii) Small dashed line is the mean impact. (iv) Sample includes 1,359
households with observations in the panel 2000/2001/2002. (v) QTE is computed for the 1st to 3rd quantiles,
but they are not included in the figures because their variances are large enough to distort the scale of
the figures. (vi) The estimation controls for household head characteristics and demographic composition
of the household.
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assumption. This section examines whether there is evidence consistent with
rank preservation. As in Bitler et al. (2005), I use the treatment and control
distributions of demographic characteristics to see if there is evidence against
rank preservation or rank reversal in each quartile. For example, if the distri-
bution of observable characteristics in some range of the expenditures distri-
bution varies significantly between the treatment and control group, this would
be evidence against rank preservation. Note, however, that rank reversal may
have occurred among unobservables even if observable characteristics do not
change.
Tables 5 and 6 present the mean difference by quartile and the p-value for
statistical significance. Each row corresponds to a demographic variable sep-
arated by household head characteristics (gender, education, age, and employ-
ment) and household demographic composition (girls 0–5 years, boys 0–5
years, girls 6–15 years, and boys 6–15 years). The test is performed for a total
of eight variables and, thus, tables 5 and 6 present 32 tests for each distribution
and year. Panel A classifies people by their position (quartile) in the per capita
total expenditure distribution, and panel B classifies people by their position
in the per capita food expenditure distribution. Table 5 presents the results
from the exercise using the 2001 data, whereas table 6 presents the results
using the 2002 data.
Of the 128 differences, 18 are statistically significant at the 10% level or
below in 2001 and 2002. The individual test suggests that some rank reversal
may be present based on these demographic characteristics. The joint test for
the significance of the differences within a given quantile range, however, fails
to reject the null for all ranges of per capita food expenditure and per capita
total expenditure.20 While the individual tests suggest that some rank reversal
may be present along observables, the joint test results show that strict rank
reversal is not rejected.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
This study assesses the importance of heterogeneity in impacts of conditional
cash transfers using a social experiment from a poverty alleviation program in
Nicaragua. Heterogeneity in program impacts is expected to arise because of
the design and implementation of the program. The theoretical model shows
that program impacts vary with observable characteristics, the targeting di-
mension, and the conditionality of the program.
The first part of the paper analyzes impacts at the subgroup level by es-
20 See Bitler et al. (2005) for a detailed explanation of the joint test for the significance of the
demographic variables.
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80 economic development and cultural change
timating the interaction between the treatment indicator and covariates of
interest. The estimates also show that children living in more impoverished
localities experienced larger impacts of the program on schooling in 2001, but
this result is reversed in 2002. The second part of the paper analyzes quantile
treatment effects. The results suggest evidence against the common effect
assumption. The estimates show that the impact of the program is lower for
households who were at a lower level of expenditures prior to the program.
That is, the RPS program has a greater effect on households who would
otherwise have had a high per capita total and food expenditures. Quantile
treatment effect estimates show that there was considerable heterogeneity in
the impacts of the RPS on the distributions of expenditures, which is missed
by looking only at average treatment effects. As the theoretical framework
suggests, the impacts are greater for households with higher expenditures who
are more likely to be meeting or almost meeting program requirements prior
to the program. For households with lower expenditures who are more likely
to not be meeting the requirements, and for whom the cost of participation
is the highest, program impacts are still positive but smaller than for house-
holds at the upper end of the distribution. Tests of the null hypothesis of
constant treatment effects reveal that these findings could not have been ob-
tained using mean impact analysis. In addition, joint tests of rank preservation
show that the distributions of observable characteristics in all ranges of the
expenditures distribution do not vary significantly between the treatment and
control group. These results have important implications for the implemen-
tation and evaluation of conditional cash transfers that are spreading rapidly
in developing countries.
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Appendix
Figure A1. Quantile treatment effect on the distribution of annual per capita total expenditures in
2000. (i) Solid line is the treatment quantile effect. (ii) Dashed lines provide confidence interval from
the bootstrap with 1,000 replications clustered at the locality level. (iii) Small dashed line is the mean
impact. (iv) Sample includes 1,359 households with observations in the panel 2000/2001/2002. (v) In
Nicaraguan Cordobas, the equivalent exchange rate is US$1 p C$13. (vi) QTE is computed for the
91st to 99th quantiles, but they are not included in the figures because their variances are large enough
to distort the scale of the figures.
Figure A2. Quantile treatment effect on the distribution of annual per capita food expenditures in
2000. (i) Solid line is the treatment quantile effect. (ii) Dashed lines provide confidence interval from
the bootstrap with 1,000 replications clustered at the locality level. (iii) Small dashed line is the mean
impact. (iv) Sample includes 1,359 households with observations in the panel 2000/2001/2002. (v) In
Nicaraguan Cordobas, the equivalent exchange rate is US$1 p C$13. (vi) QTE is computed for the
91st to 99th quantiles, but they are not included in the figures because their variances are large enough
to distort the scale of the figures.
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